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ABSTRACT
In this Article, we show how our society can use corporate
governance shifts to address, if not entirely resolve, a number of currently
pressing social and economic problems. These problems include: rising
income inequality; demographic disparities in wealth and equity
ownership; increasing poverty and income insecurity; a need for greater
innovation and investment in solving problems like disease and climate
change; the “externalization” of many costs of corporate activity onto third
parties such as customers, employees, creditors, and the broader society;
the corrosive influence of corporate money in politics; and discontent and
loss of trust in the capitalist system among a large and growing segment
of the population.
We demonstrate how, to a very significant extent, these problems can
be traced to the way shares in business corporations are currently owned,
traded, and voted. We also offer a plausible plan for shifting the structure
of share ownership, trading, and voting to create a more democratic and
sustainable capitalism that allows business corporations to better serve
humanity. Our proposal, which envisions developing a new form of
institutional shareholder, does not rely either on market forces or
government interventions. Rather, it relies on voluntary cooperation and
the private ordering of free individuals using modern information
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technologies. It operates to reduce inequalities not only in wealth and
income but also in influence over business corporations.
INTRODUCTION
Change begins with imagining something better. In this Article, we
imagine a future where our society has ameliorated, if not resolved, a
number of currently pressing social and economic problems. These
problems include: rising socioeconomic inequality; racial and generational
disparities in participation in equity markets; increasing poverty and
income insecurity; inadequate innovation and investment in solving
problems like disease and climate change; the “externalization” of many
costs of corporate activity, such as carbon emissions, systemic risk, and
the degradation of human health, onto third parties (customers, employees,
creditors, the broader society); the corrosive influence of corporate money
in politics; and the disengagement and alienation of large and growing
segments of the population, leading to loss of trust in the capitalist system
and the possibility of civic unrest.
The insight underlying our approach is that governments are not the
only institutions that can solve collective social and economic problems.
Another type of powerful institution—the business corporation—can be
brought to bear. Many of today’s corporations rival nation-states in
weight, influence, and reach. Collectively, they control tens of trillions of
dollars in assets and affect hundreds of millions of customers, employees,
and shareholders. Indeed, the corporate sector can be analogized to a kind
of parallel state or shadow government that touches all our lives on a daily
basis. The corporate sector can provide enormous benefits: investment
returns, employment opportunities, innovative products, and tax revenues.
It can also inflict great harms: environmental damage, consumer frauds,
political corruption, and employee deaths and injuries.
We all have a stake in how our business corporations are governed.
Yet many laypersons think of corporations as an irresistible force that
helps or harms, but remains outside average citizens’ control.1 As experts
in corporate governance, we recognize this state of affairs need not be
inevitable. Many of our current economic and social problems can be
traced to the way shares in business corporations are currently owned,
traded, and voted. In particular, the economic benefits of equity ownership
are highly concentrated today among older, whiter, and wealthier

1. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis once famously described the corporation as a
“Frankenstein monster.” Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 567 (1933).
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investors.2 Shareholder influence over corporations is even more
concentrated. Recognizing that their individual votes are unlikely to
matter, many individual shareholders who own stocks directly do not vote
their shares at all.3 Others who invest through institutions like mutual or
pension funds leave the job of share voting to a handful of professional
fund managers who, in turn, typically expect to keep the shares of any
particular company for two years or less.4 The result is a public company
sector where firms are driven to focus far more on boosting short-term
share price than on pursuing long-term, sustainable, and socially beneficial
corporate strategies.5
This Article outlines a plausible plan for shifting the structure of
share ownership, trading, and voting to create a more democratic,
sustainable, and responsible capitalism. It envisions the creation of a new
type of institutional shareholder we dub the Universal Fund (Fund) and the
broad distribution of ownership of shares in that Fund so that all citizens—
including young people, people of color, and less wealthy people—reap
the economic benefits of the corporations that are the engines of our
economy. Additionally, the plan would ensure that citizens who receive
shares in the new fund have incentive to focus on long-term corporate
2. See infra text accompanying notes 36–37. In recent years, equity ownership has become even
more unequal. See Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Stock Ownership Down Among All but Older, HigherIncome, GALLUP (May 24, 2017), http://www.gallup.com/poll/211052/stock-ownership-downamong-older-higher-income.aspx (explaining that the U.S. stock ownership rate is declining among
all Americans except upper-income, older ones; in 2008, sixty-two percent of U.S. adults owned stock,
whereas in 2017, only fifty-four percent did).
3. So many shareholders are reluctant to vote that, in order to make a quorum, corporations often
must hire third party proxy solicitation services to contact shareholders and try to persuade them to
vote. See, e.g., Our History, GEORGESON, http://www.georgeson.com/us/about-us/our-history
[https://perma.cc/XXF8-C7JV].
4. See INV. CO. INST., MUTUAL FUNDS AND PORTFOLIO TURNOVER 2 (Nov. 17, 2004),
https://www.ici.org/pdf/rc_v1n2.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK6V-9LAR ] (stating that in 2004, there was
an average 117% portfolio turnover rate for mutual funds, implying an average holding period of less
than a year); Alon Brav et. al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance,
63 J. FIN. 1729, 1732 (2008) (explaining that the turnover rate suggests 20-month holding periods for
hedge funds in the sample); see also LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 66 (2012) (stating that
in 2010, average turnover for equities listed on U.S. exchanges was 300%, implying a four-month
average holding period).
5. See THE ASPEN INST. BUS. & SOC’Y PROGRAM, OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR
A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT (2009),
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/overcome_short_state0909_0.pd
f [https://perma.cc/W5ZT-9K2L]; THE CONFERENCE BD., IS SHORT-TERM BEHAVIOR JEOPARDIZING
THE FUTURE PROSPERITY OF BUSINESS? (2015), www.wlrk.com/docs/IsShortTermBehavior
JeopardizingTheFutureProsperityOfBusiness_CEOStrategicImplications.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
W4FD-J2YP]; J.W. MASON, UNDERSTANDING SHORT-TERMISM: QUESTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES
(2015), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Understanding-Short-Termism.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H8VE-TYGF].
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sustainability and social and environmental impacts, rather than short-term
share prices. Also, it would make it far easier for them to exercise an
effective voice in corporate governance.
Democratic processes are important to ensuring governments serve
their citizens. We show how similar benefits can be enjoyed by promoting
more democracy in business corporations. Conversely, policy discussions
that ignore or misunderstand the complex web of individuals, institutions,
and rules that currently govern our corporate sector, at best, overlook a
critical component of reform, and at worst, produce plans and proposals
that are harmful.6 Corporations can generate not only private gains but
public good. Indeed, engaging the full power of our business sector may
be essential to meet many of our greatest challenges. It is not enough to
have a democratic political system. We also need democratic capitalism.
This Article suggests how to build it.
It is important to note our proposal does not rely either on market
forces or government interventions. Rather, it relies on the voluntary
cooperation and private ordering of free individuals using modern
information technologies. Moreover, while our plan is utopian, it is also
achievable. Even if initially adopted only on a small scale, it is designed
to grow in size and effect over time. The primary obstacles to our plan’s
implementation are psychological, especially the often-unspoken beliefs
that large problems cannot be solved through voluntary coordination; that
humans are always and only selfish; and that anything that has not been
done in the past cannot succeed in the future. Through the exercise of
imagination, these obstacles can be overcome.
I.

A THUMBNAIL SKETCH OF THE PROPOSAL

Perhaps the best way to set the stage for exploring the strengths and
weaknesses of our proposal is to first present its basic features. Space
constraints necessarily prevent us from presenting a detailed discussion,
which we are developing in other work.7 Here, we offer a basic outline to
provide the basis for exploring some of our plan’s more important
implications and challenges.
6. For example, in 1993, Congress amended the tax code to require public companies to tie their
top executives’ pay to objective performance metrics to ensure full tax deductibility—a rule change
that encouraged widespread use of stock-based compensation schemes that, in turn, encouraged
pathological corporate behaviors, including excessive risk-taking and fraud. Lynn A. Stout, Killing
Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences of “Pay for Performance,” 39 J. CORP. L.
526, 533–35 (2014).
7. With coauthor Tamara Belinfanti, we are preparing a book for Berrett-Koehler Publishers that
expands upon this Article. LYNN A. STOUT ET AL., CITIZEN CAPITALISM: HOW A UNIVERSAL FUND
CAN PROVIDE INCOME AND INFLUENCE TO ALL (forthcoming 2019) (on file with authors).
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We have dubbed our proposal the Blueprint for Citizen Capitalism
(Blueprint). Blueprint has five basic elements. First, upon reaching the age
of eighteen years, all U.S. citizens8 would receive a share in a collective
portfolio of securities—in effect, a share in a collective mutual fund, the
Fund. As in a typical mutual fund, the Fund’s shareholders would
periodically receive a proportionate share of all dividends and interest
payments paid to the Universal Fund Portfolio (Portfolio).9 Ideally, under
our Blueprint, the Portfolio would include equity securities from a wide
variety of corporations, both public and private. With this structure in
mind, we call the Fund’s shareholders Universal Shareholders
(Shareholders).10
Second, at least initially,11 the Fund would acquire the securities in
its Portfolio primarily from shares donated by high-net worth individuals
and companies, for example, during public offerings.12 We explore these
and other funding options in greater detail later but note here such

8. Although for purposes of discussion, we propose distributing shares to U.S. citizens older than
seventeen years. It is of course possible to adopt other selection criteria (e.g., citizens of all ages, all
legal residents, citizens of another nation or the European Union, and so forth).
9. Our proposal embraces the spirit of the many Universal Basic Income (UBI) proposals that
have been offered over the years. Such proposals date back at least to Thomas Paine’s 1797 proposal
for a citizen’s dividend. See THOMAS PAINE, AGRARIAN JUSTICE (1797) (proposing that all citizens
receive a “citizens dividend” as compensation for the “loss of his or her natural inheritance, by the
introduction of the system of landed property”). This idea has since attracted advocates ranging from
Milton Friedman to tech billionaires like Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg. See Sebastian Johnson,
The Case for a Universal Basic Income, L.A. TIMES (June 29, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/
op-ed/la-oe-johnson-universal-basic-income-20170629-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZZV4-W9TU].
Blueprint also echoes proposals to redistribute wealth like Anne Alstott’s and Bruce Ackerman’s
proposal for “The Stakeholder Society,” outlined in their 1999 book. ANNE ALSTOTT & BRUCE
ACKERMAN, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999) (proposing that all U.S. citizens receive a onetime
payment of $80,000 upon reaching the age of 21). Similarly, Robert Hockett has proposed to
redistribute all resources so that citizens are in positions of equality in an “efficient equal-opportunity
republic.” See Robert C. Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means: Values,
Constraints, and Finance in the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary American “Ownership
Society,” 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 48 (2005).
10. Our concept of the Universal Shareholder should not be confused with the “universal
investor” or “universal owner” label sometimes applied to large institutional investors like pension
and mutual funds, which are so broadly diversified that they are more concerned with the performance
of the economy as a whole than with the performance of a single company. See generally JAMES P.
HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM: HOW INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS CAN MAKE CORPORATE AMERICA MORE DEMOCRATIC (2000).
11. After some period of time and to a growing extent, Shareholders’ interest in the Fund would
also increase in value as the shares of deceased Shareholders revert to the Fund upon death.
12. The Fund would also hold shares of nonpublic companies to the extent these shares were
contributed by either the companies themselves or by their shareholders. Leaving shares to the Fund
might be an attractive option for founders of private companies who want to leave a legacy or increase
the chances their companies remain in operation after their deaths.
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donations are quite likely.13 Many corporations are interested in being
perceived as “good citizens,” as evidenced by corporate philanthropy and
the growing interest in so-called benefit corporations.14 Other corporations
might view the Universal Fund as a desirable long-term shareholder.15
Similarly, many high net worth individuals have a keen interest in
philanthropy, as demonstrated by the Giving Pledge recently organized by
Bill Gates and Warren Buffett. By 2016, the Giving Pledge had attracted
154 signatories from sixteen countries, each of whom had pledged to give
away at least half of their wealth.16
Third, the Administrators of the Universal Fund would not be entitled
to any portion of the profits generated by the Fund—they would not be
residual claimants. Rather, they would be passive functionaries
compensated only by a fixed fee that (unlike fees in the typical mutual
fund) would not be based on the Fund’s performance or assets under
management.17 This administrative fee should be quite low because, unlike
the managers of most mutual funds today, the Administrators would not
be allowed to trade securities in an effort to reap trading profits.18
Securities would exit the Portfolio only through transactions controlled by
third parties (e.g., through an agreement of merger or the maturation of a

13. See infra text accompanying notes 76–80.
14. See Suntae Kim et al., Why Companies Are Becoming B Corporations, HARV. BUS. REV.
(June 17, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/06/why-companies-are-becoming-b-corporations [https://perma.
cc/XUG5-PNQ9]; see also CR’s 100 Best Corporate Citizens 2017, CORP. RESP. MAG., Mar.–Apr.
2017, http://www.thecro.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/CR_100Bestpages_digitalR.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5HNW-MZ74]; Giving USA 2017 Infographic, GIVING USA, https://givingusa.org/see-thenumbers-giving-usa-2017-infographic/ [https://perma.cc/3KCF-5G8J] (noting that giving from
corporations amounted to $18.55 billion in 2016). Corporate philanthropy can also attract substantial
positive attention.
15. To the extent that corporate directors and managers feel pressure to abandon desirable
strategies in order to placate short term shareholders, see supra note 5, they might prefer to have a
significant block of shares held by the Fund, an intrinsically long-term investor whose Administrators
and Shareholders cannot buy or sell. See infra text accompanying notes 50–58.
16. Laura Lorenzetti, 17 More Billionaires Join Buffett and Gates’ Giving Pledge this Year,
FORTUNE (June 1, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/01/giving-pledge-new-members-2016/ [https://
perma.cc/TU7P-VT8R].
17. If Administrators were compensated according to the size or performance of the Fund, this
would create a perverse incentive for the Administrators to try to inflate the Portfolio’s reported market
value, e.g., by withholding or making it difficult for Shareholders to receive dividends. It could also
result in Administrators being rewarded or punished for market shifts beyond their control.
18. Administrative fees for the Fund will resemble fees paid to “passively managed” or “index”
funds, which generally are extremely low. For example, where the average actively managed stock
fund charges expenses of 1.34% of assets managed annually, Vanguard and Schwab offer “ETF”
equity funds that charge annual fees of only 0.05–0.03%. Heather Long, The Best Cheap Investment
Funds, CNN MONEY (June 6, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/06/investing/invest-in-fundswith-low-fees/index.html [https://perma.cc/WJK4-DKXW].
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bond).19 The Administrators’ job would be just that—passive
administration, including maintaining a list of Shareholders, distributing
dividends, and so forth.
Fourth, Shareholders in the Fund would not be allowed to sell,
hypothecate, or bequeath their shares.20 Shares would be held throughout
the Shareholders’ lives, and upon their deaths, their interests in the Fund
would revert to the Fund itself (thus, marginally increasing the value of all
other Shareholders’ interests, just as the issuance of new shares to new
Shareholders would marginally dilute all other Shareholders’ interests).
The sole economic benefit enjoyed by Shareholders by virtue of their
interest in the Fund would be a proportionate interest in the dividends and
interest the Fund received from its portfolio securities. This economic
interest makes Shareholders, of necessity, long-term shareholders.21
Rational Shareholders would anticipate that as long as the companies
whose shares and bonds were held by the Fund pay dividends and interest,
they will receive a stream of income. This income stream would not be
guaranteed. Rather, it would be determined by the performance and
distribution policies of the underlying corporations whose securities were
held in the Portfolio.
Finally, unlike either the typical mutual fund, or the typical wealth
redistribution or basic income proposal,22 under Blueprint Shareholders
would receive not only a proportionate economic right to dividends and
interest paid into the Portfolio but also a proportionate political right to
direct how Administrators vote the equity securities held in the Portfolio
in the annual and special shareholders’ meetings.23 The governance of
19. The cash generated from such transactions could be used by the Administrators to purchase
additional equity securities according to some automatic rule, such as “buy more stocks in the same
proportions as those already found in the Portfolio or “buy the stocks in the S&P index.”
20. Universal Fund Share ownership would thus become an “inalienable right.” See generally
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). Restrictions on Shareholders’ sale,
bequeathing, or hypothecation of shares could be enforced by making such transactions legally invalid.
Cf. Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market
for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 713–21 (1999) (discussing common law rule making
derivative contracts legally unenforceable).
21. Although Shareholders nearing the end of their life expectancy may be more short-term
oriented (for example, preferring that companies adopt overly generous dividend policies), their
interests will be counterbalanced by younger Shareholders who prefer that corporations invest
optimally for future returns. This dynamic is different from the incentives of today’s shareholders,
who typically hold shares for two years or less. See supra note 4.
22. See supra note 9.
23. Today, mutual funds generally do not offer their investors the option of directing how the
shares in the fund portfolio should be voted, likely because it is not rational for such investors to want
to vote. See infra note 86 (discussing “rational apathy”).
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companies in the Portfolio is a common good, and the transaction costs
associated with becoming informed and issuing instructions would deter
most Shareholders from giving voting instructions directly as individuals.
However, Shareholders could delegate their voting rights to shareholder
“proxy service” firms, similar to those that exist today to develop voting
guidelines and cast delegated votes for institutional investors (e.g., Glass
Lewis and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)).24 Blueprint would
create incentives to develop proxy services that cater to the long-term,
diversified interests of Shareholders because it would mandate that the
cost of these firms’ services (typically quite small)25 be borne by the Fund
rather than by individual Shareholders. Such an arrangement would
promote the development of new proxy services that compete for
Shareholders’ patronage on the basis of the quality of voting guidelines
and services, rather than low cost.26 Thus, unlike retail investors today,
Shareholders could end up exercising significant collective influence over
how the companies held in the Portfolio are governed.
This brief Introduction, laying out the bare bones of our proposal, has
likely raised questions in the minds of many readers. We hope to answer
many of them in Parts I and II (below), which offer a more detailed
discussion of how Blueprint can address a range of social concerns and
discuss possible critiques and challenges. Due to space constraints and the
inevitable uncertainty associated with designing complex new institutions,
it is not possible in these pages to describe every possible element of the
Fund and the accompanying new shareholder proxy services envisioned
by Blueprint. Nor can we provide definitive answers here to every possible
policy choice or question Blueprint poses. We hope simply to persuade
most readers that such details are worthy of being debated and determined
in future work and to offer a promising new direction for using voluntary
private ordering and corporate governance to address, if not entirely

24. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-47, CORPORATE
SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS: PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS’ ROLE IN VOTING AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PRACTICES (2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/681050.pdf [https://perma.cc/
738C-AT5Q]; Lynn A. Stout, Guest Column, Why Should ISS Be the New Master of the Corporate
Governance Universe?, DOW JONES CORP. GOVERNANCE, Jan. 4, 2006.
25. Although mutual funds do not break out the fees—they pay proxy services in their SEC
filings—necessarily, the fees must be significantly less than the total annual administrative expenses
incurred by index funds, which can be as little as 0.03–0.05% of assets. See supra note 18.
26. Mutual funds feel pressured by federal regulations to use proxy services but remain rationally
indifferent to the quality of their voting guidelines. They therefore prefer to select a proxy service that
has the lowest possible cost and that other funds use (thus, providing regulatory “cover”). Moreover,
to the extent that actively managed mutual funds use proxy services, their relatively short holding
drives them to prefer proxy service guidelines that emphasize short-term share price performance. See
generally Tamara C. Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry: The Case
for Increased Oversight and Control, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 384 (2009); Stout, supra note 24.
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resolve, social and economic problems that have proven resistant to market
forces and government regulation.
II.

PROBLEMS ADDRESSED

To understand the potential power of Blueprint, it is useful to begin
by recognizing the wide range of social and economic problems it can help
address. These problems include—but importantly, are not limited to—the
inequality and income insecurity that typical wealth redistribution and
basic income proposals focus on. Thus, we briefly describe below seven
economic and social phenomena that are widely recognized today in the
United States as problems in need of a remedy. They are: rising inequality,
a persistent racial divide in wealth and equity ownership, increasing
poverty and income insecurity, a need for more innovation and investment
in the future, the externalization of many costs of corporate activity, the
corrupting influence of corporate money in politics, and rising civic
discontent and related “soft” social ills.
A. Rising Inequality
There is considerable debate today over wealth and income
inequality, which appears to be increasing in the United States. For
example, the share of wealth held by the top 0.1% of wealth holders
increased from seven percent in 1978 to twenty-two percent by 2012.27
Many informed observers believe inequality is likely to worsen in
the future. Thomas Piketty has famously argued in his best-selling book,
Capital in the Twenty-First Century, that returns to capital now exceed
economic growth rates and further suggested reasons why asset holders’
incomes may exceed wage earners’ even more in the future.28 He has
estimated that the top ten percent of income earners saw their share of
national income increase from thirty to thirty-five percent to forty-five to
fifty percent between the 1970s and the 2000s, and if this trend continues,
the top decile will capture sixty percent by 2030.29 Commentators have
identified other trends likely to worsen inequality, including: the
27. Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913:
Evidence From Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519, 520 (2016). Inequality is also
endemic at the global level; the net worth of the eight richest individuals, six of whom are American,
now equals the wealth of the bottom half of the remaining human population. OXFAM INT’L, AN
ECONOMY FOR THE 99%: IT’S TIME TO BUILD A HUMAN ECONOMY THAT BENEFITS EVERYONE, NOT
JUST THE PRIVILEGED FEW 2, 10 (2017), https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_
attachments/bp-economy-for-99-percent-160117-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2GX-DMZA].
28. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 22–27, 220–22, 350–60
(Arthur Goldhammer trans., President & Fellows Harv. Coll. 2014).
29. Id. at 294.
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elimination of many jobs through automation,30 the increasing
concentration of stock ownership in public companies,31 the recent pattern
of public companies disappearing to be replaced by private companies,32
and the creation of massive fortunes that allow the ultra-wealthy to acquire
still more wealth through corruption and political rent-seeking.33
Blueprint works to temper inequality by redistributing ownership of
equity more equally; thus, providing additional ongoing income that
contributes relatively more to the incomes of lower earners.34 Although
considerable inequality would persist (as is true under most wealth
redistribution and basic income proposals), Blueprint has one additional
and highly significant advantage over other proposals. That advantage is:
Blueprint does not require government intervention or coercive taxation,
whether of wealth, incomes, or robots that replace human workers.35
Rather, Blueprint tempers inequality through the voluntary actions of
individuals and corporations, and eventually, the return of shares to the
Fund upon the deaths of individual Shareholders.
B. Demographic Differences in Equity Ownership
Wealth and income are not only distributed unequally today; this
inequality follows racial and generational patterns, especially in equity
ownership. For example, in 2011, the median financial wealth (checking
and retirement accounts) of African–Americans was only $200, while that

30. See infra text accompanying notes 37 and 41.
31. See GALLUP, supra note 2 (stating that stock ownership declined from sixty-two percent to
fifty-four percent from financial crisis).
32. See GERALD F. DAVIS, THE VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING THE
HAZARDS OF A NEW ECONOMY 15–17 (2016) (stating that domestic companies listed on U.S.
exchanges declined from more than 8000 in 1996 to just over 4000 in 2012); Bob Bryan, There Are
Nowhere Near as Many Public Companies in the U.S. as There Should Be, BUS. INSIDER (July 5, 2015
8:27 AM), www.businessinsider.com/us-has-too-few-publicly-listed-companies-2015-6 [https://
perma.cc/2KD4-44BB] (citing a study concluding that U.S. listings were declining while listings
elsewhere were increasing, and that more than half of the “listing gap” was attributable to new
companies declining to list).
33. See Moses Naim, The Problem with Piketty’s Inequality Formula, ATLANTIC (May 27,
2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/05/the-problem-with-pikettysinequality-formula/371653/ [https://perma.cc/23PN-CHTL].
34. When wealthy individuals and less wealthy individuals receive equal dividends, the relative
benefits are greater for the less wealthy.
35. Thomas Piketty advocates for a progressive annual tax on capital. PIKKETY, supra note 28,
at 572. Tech billionaire, Bill Gates, has proposed taxing robots that replace human workers. I,
Taxpayer, ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 2017, at 72. See generally James K. Boyce & Peter Barnes, How to
Pay for Universal Basic Income, EVONOMICS (Nov. 28, 2016), http://evonomics.com/how-to-pay-foruniversal-basic-income/ [https://perma.cc/5KSK-MY7E].
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of whites was $23,000.36 Fully thirty-eight percent of African-Americans
had no financial assets, compared to only fourteen percent of whites.
Younger citizens also are underrepresented in equity markets. Where
sixty-two percent of individuals ages fifty to sixty-four hold stocks, only
thirty-one percent of individuals ages eighteen to twenty-nine do, and the
percentage of eighteen to twenty-nine-year-olds who invest is declining.37
Demographic differences in equity ownership raise several troubling
issues beyond the overarching issue of socioeconomic inequality. Racial
gaps in equity ownership can be attributed in large part to the persisting
effects of past racialized policies (e.g., slavery, segregation, exclusionary
laws) as well as present disadvantages (e.g., failing schools, housing and
employment discrimination). Such inequality of opportunity raises
important questions of justice and morality and creates realistic
perceptions of relative disadvantage that contribute to racial tension and
civil unrest. It also poses economic challenges: as the United States
becomes more racially diverse, it becomes more important to ensure that
all segments of our population have the resources needed to become
productive citizens and consumers. Age-based differences also raise
problems. For example, older shareholders are likely to prefer companies
that pursue short-term goals rather than make long-term investments, and
retirees may be less concerned about how companies treat employees than
younger shareholders who are still in the workforce. Yet, to the extent
individual shareholders participate in corporate governance, it is older,
whiter (and of course wealthier)38 citizens who exercise the most influence
over companies.
36. REBECCA TIPPETT ET AL., CTR. FOR GLOBAL POLICY SOLUTIONS, BEYOND BROKE: WHY
CLOSING THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP IS A PRIORITY FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC SECURITY 2 (May
2014), http://globalpolicysolutions.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/BeyondBroke_Exec_Summary.
pdf [https://perma.cc/L27M-6Q7K]. In 2013, the percentage of non-Hispanic black or Hispanic
households owning stocks was 36–37%, whereas the percentage of non-Hispanic white households
owning stocks was 60%. GALLUP, supra note 2. The mean value of stock holdings for households with
holdings was $99,200 for non-Hispanic black or Hispanic households, and $315,400 for white, nonHispanic households. GALLUP, supra note 2.
37. GALLUP, supra note 2. In 2013, the mean value of stock holdings for households whose head
was less than thirty-five years old amounted to $42,700. For households whose head was between
sixty-five and seventy-four, the mean amounted to $552,200. U.S. FED RESERVE, SURVEY OF
CONSUMER FINANCES CHARTBOOK (2013) [hereinafter SCF]. While age-based differences in equity
ownership can be traced in part to the investing life cycle (savings tend to accumulate overtime), to
the extent older citizens participate more in corporate governance, they exercise greater influence over
corporate behavior.
38. In 2013, only 11.4% of households in the bottom twenty percent for income held stocks,
whereas ninety-three percent of households in the top decile for income held stocks. SFC, supra note
37, at 510. Moreover, only 15.8% of households in the bottom twenty-five percent for net worth held
stocks, whereas 91.6% of households in the top decile for net worth held stocks. Id. at 540. The mean
value of stock holdings for households with holdings in the bottom twenty-five percent of net worth
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While hardly a definitive solution, Blueprint would counteract these
patterns by redistributing both investment returns from, and control over,
the corporate sector. This would allow our corporations to better benefit
all our citizens. The result would be more justice, less racial tension, and
a brighter future.
C. Increasing Poverty and Income Insecurity
In addition to rising inequality and demographic differences in equity
markets, the United States has also seen increasing poverty in recent years.
In 2014, the U.S. poverty rate was four percent higher than it had been
four decades earlier.39 This trend has likely been driven by many of the
same factors that contribute to rising inequality.40 For example, some
estimates predict that automation could eliminate almost half of all jobs in
the near future.41 Such developments threaten not only more poverty but
also greater income insecurity—insecurity worsened by the erosion of the
social safety net provided by family and community ties and by social
insurance programs like Medicare and Social Security.42
It is worth noting that inequality and poverty have their own negative
macroeconomic effects. For example, poverty and economic stress make
it difficult for individuals to invest in their own human capital.43 And a
robust literature shows that income inequality is harmful to economic
growth.44
Blueprint would help address these problems, albeit imperfectly.
This is because it would give Shareholders a variable income subsidy
determined by the dividends received by the Portfolio. Although it would
not provide a guaranteed minimum level of income, this is an advantage
was $6,400, whereas the mean value of stock holdings for households with holdings in the top decile
was $1,161,700. Id. at 542.
39. Anthony B. Atkinson, How to Spread the Wealth: Practical Policies for Reducing Inequality,
95 FOREIGN AFF. 29, 29 (2016).
40. See supra text accompanying notes 23–35.
41. MCKINSEY & CO., A FUTURE THAT WORKS: AUTOMATION EMPLOYMENT AND
PRODUCTIVITY 4 (2017); Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How
Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?, 114 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 254, 265 (2017).
42. See ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (2000) (discussing declines in community support and activity); Soc. Sec. & Medicare
Bd. of Tr., A Summary of the 2017 Annual Reports, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/
oact/trsum/ [https://perma.cc/N5P7-LG4J ] (“Both Social Security and Medicare face long-term
financing shortfalls.”).
43. Acquiring education and skills takes time and money that are generally not available to those
struggling for subsistence.
44. See Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, 109 Q. J.
ECON. 465, 478–84 (1994); Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?,
84 AM. ECON. REV. 600, 607–08 (1994).
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to the extent we are concerned that a guaranteed income might create too
great a disincentive to work and invest in one’s own human capital.45
D. Need for More Innovation and Investment in the Future
Unlike proprietorships and most partnerships, corporations are
perpetual entities.46 Add in the corporate characteristics of asset lock-in,
limited liability, delegated management, and transferable shares, and
corporations become institutions particularly well-suited to making longterm, large-scale, uncertain investments, such as investments in major
infrastructure projects and in the invention and development of new and
transformative products and services.47 Corporations were critical to the
development of (to give just a few examples) the railroads, the electrical
grid, and the internet. Today, they are developing cleaner energy sources,
self-driving cars, and cures for cancer.48
Such corporate innovations and investments provide a myriad of
economic and social benefits, including not only financial returns for stock
and bondholders but also employment opportunities, quality products, tax
revenues for governments, and transformative technologies that contribute
to human well-being. Moreover, those benefits contribute to the welfare
of not only present but future generations. New York City’s residents still
draw power from the electrical grid developed by the Edison Illuminating
Company, the corporate precursor to today’s Consolidated Edison.49
However, there is reason to fear that recent changes in shareholding
and share voting patterns are degrading corporations’ ability and
willingness to devote resources to developing such critical long-term
projects.50 Tax incentives have created large institutional investors like
pension and mutual funds; reduced trading costs have made it possible for
them to seek profits from short-term trading; and the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission’s (SEC) rules have given them power to influence

45. See Eduardo Porter, A Universal Basic Income Is a Poor Tool to Fight Poverty, N.Y. TIMES
(May 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/01/business/economy/universal-basic-incomepoverty.html (discussing disincentives to work).
46. See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 764, 766,
(2012); Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity,
Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685, 694–98 (2015).
47. Stout, supra note 46, at 687–89.
48. Id. at 699, 702–03.
49. The History of Alternating Current: The History of Electrification, EDISON TECH CTR.,
http://www.edisontechcenter.org/HistElectPowTrans.html [https://perma.cc/E5MA-ZYWV].
50. Stout, supra note 46, at 708–21; see also supra note 5.
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corporate behavior.51 The result—many influential academics, business
leaders, and policy research institutes have argued—is a large and
powerful shareholder class with perverse incentives to pressure managers
to pursue short-term financial results while neglecting long-term
investments.52 For example, in the 1950s, American corporations retained
sixty percent of their profits for research and development (R&D); today
they retain less than ten percent.53 Rather than reinvesting, American
corporations buy back their own stock and reduce “expenses” like payroll
and R&D to artificially boost earnings per share.54 The great American
corporate research labs of the mid- to late-20th century are disappearing
as employees are cut and the focus is shifted from pure research to modest
projects with immediate profit potential.55
Blueprint would help address this problem by creating a new,
powerful, and inherently long-term institutional investor, the Fund. The
Administrators cannot trade, and the Shareholders cannot sell or
hypothecate their shares. Neither have reason to focus on the share prices
of the companies in the Portfolio.56 Indeed, to the extent Blueprint gives
Shareholders a bigger role in corporate governance (which they will
typically exercise by selecting a proxy service whose voting guidelines
51. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 1907, 1922–23 (2013). See generally Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder
Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003 (2013).
52. See, e.g., supra note 51. The perverse incentives arise from the fact that while most
individuals want to make long-term, diversified investments not only in different equities but also in
bonds, real estate, and their own human capital, the portfolio managers who make trading decisions
for mutual, pension, and hedge funds are judged only on their short-term performance and are
relatively undiversified. See STOUT, supra note 4, at 50–51 (describing investor “Tragedy of the
Commons”), 63–94 (describing why fund managers are poor representatives of individual investors’
interests). See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic
Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (2014).
53. David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation,
107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139, 148–49 (2013) (citing Jack B. Jacobs, ‘Patient Capital’: Can Delaware
Corporate Law Help Revive It?, 4 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1645–64 (2011)); see also Robert J.
Gordon, Policy Insight No. 63: Is U.S. Economic Growth Over? Faltering Innovation Confronts the
Six Headwinds, CTR. ECON. POL’Y RESEARCH (Sept. 2012), http://cepr.org/sites/default/
files/policy_insights/PolicyInsight63.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AZC-QDTC].
54. William Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2014, https://hbr.org/
2014/09/profits-without-prosperity [https://perma.cc/WC6Y-CZQG].
55. Chris Matthews, The Death of American Research and Development, FORTUNE (Dec. 20,
2015), http://fortune.com/2015/12/21/death-american-research-and-development/ [https://perma.cc/
Q5T6-UXGZ].
56. There remains the problem of executive compensation schemes that give company
executives such a focus. See supra text accompanying note 6; see also MICHAEL B. DORFF,
INDISPENSABLE AND OTHER MYTHS: WHY THE CEO PAY EXPERIMENT FAILED AND HOW TO FIX IT
123–49 (2014). If Blueprint succeeded in giving Shareholders, who are intrinsically long-term, a
greater role in corporate governance, they might be able to reform such executive compensation
schemes.
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suit their preferences), they counterbalance the power of short-term
investors. And, while a minority of older Shareholders nearing the end of
their lifespans may favor corporate policies that promote too-high
dividends or short-term results,57 most Shareholders are younger and have
decades of investment returns ahead of them. They have incentive to favor
efficient reinvestment for the future over immediate payouts.58 The result
is the creation and empowerment of a class of Shareholders that has, on
average, a much longer investment time horizon than the institutions that
currently exercise the loudest voice in corporate governance.
Finally, it is also possible that Blueprint can encourage more
innovation, entrepreneurship, and creativity among individual
Shareholders themselves. This is because it can reduce individuals’
immediate economic insecurity, giving them “breathing room” and
resources to take business risks and invest in their own human capital.59
E. Externalization of Costs and Benefits of Corporate Activity
Due to their great size, limited liability, and the inevitable
imperfections of tort law and government regulation, business
corporations have immense capacity to make third parties bear some of the
costs of their activity while retaining all the profits. (Joel Bakan has
famously described corporations as “externalizing machines.”)60
Examples of such external costs from corporate activity are legion,
including environmental pollution, defective goods, employee deaths and
injuries, high-risk/high-yield activities that put the financial system at risk,
and pumping carbon into the atmosphere with resulting climate change.
Although less-well recognized (albeit arguably as or more
important), social benefits are another external effect of corporate activity.
In the process of generating investment returns for shareholders,
corporations also produce jobs for employees, products for consumers, tax
revenues for governments, a skilled, socialized workforce for other
57. On the other hand, there is evidence that people tend to become more altruistic and prosocial
as they age, suggesting that older shareholders may altruistically remain interested in promoting longterm corporate investments that benefit younger generations. See generally Janelle N. Beadle et al.,
Aging, Empathy, and Prosociality, 70 J. GERONTOLOGY SERIES B: PSYCHOL. SCI. & SOC. SCI. 213
(2015).
58. Although Shareholders may be somewhat myopic, it is unrealistic to believe they would be
more focused on the short term than fund managers whose professional success often depends on the
next quarter’s portfolio returns.
59. Scott Santens, Universal Basic Income Accelerates Innovation by Reducing Our Fear of
Failure, EVONOMICS (Feb. 12, 2017), http://evonomics.com/universal-basic-income-acceleratesinnovation-reducing-fear-failure/ [https://perma.cc/8WKE-8EF8].
60. JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER 70
(2005) (titling chapter “The Externalizing Machine”).
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employers, and critical new infrastructure and technologies for the broader
society. As noted in the previous section, these social goods enormously
benefit not only present but also future generations—just as some
corporate external costs, like contributing to climate change and
environmental degradation, harm future generations.
Unfortunately, when corporations are managed to maximize only
profits or “shareholder value,” they ignore both external costs imposed and
external benefits foregone by their activity. And today’s public business
corporations face considerable pressure to maximize profits and/or
shareholder value, much of it generated by institutional shareholders like
pension, mutual, and hedge funds.61 The resulting “psychopathic”
corporate behavior (as Bakan puts it)62 emphasizes short-term financial
results while ignoring ethics and the welfare of stakeholders and future
generations. This approach fails to serve most shareholders, because they
are not only shareholders; they are also consumers, employees, taxpayers,
organisms that must live in the environment, and ethical beings who often
care (to at least some degree) about others’ welfare, including the welfare
of those who come after them.63 From the Shareholders’ perspective,
“external” corporate costs and benefits are not really external at all.
Blueprint addresses the corporate externalities problem by giving
Shareholders a greater role in corporate governance. The Shareholders
would be able to aggregate their voting power through new Shareholderoriented proxy services similar to those that already exist to serve shortterm institutional investors. As a result, Shareholders could collectively
and effectively use their voting power to shift corporations toward better
serving society and Shareholders themselves, countering the short-term
shareholder pressures that currently drive corporate managers to maximize
profits at the expense of public health, public safety, and the planet.
F. Corporate Money in Politics
In addition to a general concern about the corporate externalities
problem, in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens
United, there has been increasing debate on the role of corporate money in
politics.64 To simplify the problem, corporations can allocate resources to
socially beneficial activities like producing quality goods and services,
61. See supra notes 4–5. Additional pressure comes from “pay for performance” executive
compensation schemes that emphasize share price or profits. See generally Stout, supra note 6.
62. BAKAN, supra note 60, at 60.
63. It does, however, serve fund managers, private equity partners, and CEOs whose pay is
driven by stock price performance, as they are much less diversified than shareholders and their greater
wealth also allows them to escape many of the external costs from corporate activity.
64. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339–40 (2010).
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generating employment opportunities, or even paying taxes. They can
also, however, devote resources to capturing the political system for what
economists call “rent-seeking.”65 One example would be devoting
resources to evading socially beneficial regulation or taxation. Between
1998 and 2008, for example, bank interests spent $3.4 billion lobbying the
U.S. government to deregulate derivatives,66 increasing systemic risk and
contributing to the 2008 financial crisis.
Business corporations can influence the political system through
campaign donations, lobbying, “revolving door” hiring, and public
relations. Individuals can do the same, of course, but corporations’ great
wealth and concentration allows them to exercise outsize influence. This
may not be a problem when corporations promote rules that serve the
broader society. Corporate political influence becomes problematic,
however, when it is used for rent-seeking. Further, rent-seeking is more
likely when corporate political activity is opaque since customers,
employees, investors, and citizens cannot detect or respond to it.
Through Blueprint, Shareholders would be empowered to
collectively address the issue of corporate money in politics. They could
do this by delegating their votes in corporate elections to proxy advisory
services whose guidelines support greater disclosure of corporate political
activities. Better corporate disclosure surrounding political activity would
allow citizens and Shareholders alike to better police against corporate
rent-seeking, and ensure that corporate political activity is directed to more
socially beneficial ends.67
G. “Softer” Social Ills
In addition to the relatively quantifiable problems described above,
Blueprint can help address other, “softer” social ills that have attracted
recent attention. One such ill is declining public support for capitalism in
general and for the corporate sector in particular.
65. See DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND
ECONOMICS 476–91 (1992) (discussing rent-seeking); Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and
the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191, 228–30 (2012). On the misuse of resources for rent-seeking
instead of for productive activity, see generally William J. Baumol, Entrepreneurship: Productive,
Unproductive, and Destructive, 98 J. POL. ECON. 893 (1990).
66. Helen Burley & Olivier Hoedeman, The Best Influence Money Can Buy, NEW
INTERNATIONALIST, Jan. 1, 2011; WALL ST. WATCH, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 15,
http://www.wallstreetwatch.org/reports/executive_summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/CCF2-XHZP].
67. Indeed, corporations may have more incentive to promote transparency than politicians do.
Fred McChesney has argued persuasively that politicians often solicit campaign contributions from
corporations by threatening regulatory action in what amounts to a form of extortion. See generally
FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL
EXTORTION (1997).
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Surveys show that public trust in business has declined significantly.
From 1977 until 1990, twenty to thirty-two percent of survey respondents
reported having “quite a lot” or “a great deal” of confidence in big
business, while between 2008 and 2017 these figures declined to only
sixteen to twenty-two percent.68 Younger generations in particular may be
losing faith in capitalism; recent polls show more young Americans
disapproving of capitalism than supporting it.69 Some might applaud such
shifts in public attitude. But to the extent a thriving business sector and
strong corporations contribute to social welfare, reduced support for
business translates to lost progress and prosperity. Blueprint can help build
public support for capitalism and the corporate sector by allowing the vast
majority of the population to benefit from, have a stake in, and influence
business corporations. It would also increase perceptions that corporations
operate in an ethical and socially beneficial fashion.
Another potential problem that could be tempered by Blueprint is the
widespread loss of a sense of personal agency and purpose that could result
if automation continues to eliminate greater and greater numbers of jobs.70
Many Shareholders might choose not to direct the Administrators on how
to vote their proportionate share of the equities in the Portfolio. However,
many others would likely elect to use a proxy service to vote their shares,
and a few might seek to become directly involved in creating voting
guidelines. This citizen involvement in corporate governance can, at least
to some extent, substitute for the sense of agency and purpose provided by
employment. Further, it can promote greater social cohesion and civic
engagement by promoting a sense of “in-group” membership among

68. Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP NEWS, http://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidenceinstitutions.aspx.
69. A 2016 Harvard poll of young adults (eighteen to twenty-nine years old) nationwide found
that fifty-one percent do not support capitalism while only forty-two percent support it. A few years
earlier, a 2011 poll of the same demographic by the Pew Research Center found that forty-six percent
had positive views of capitalism and 47% had negative views. Max Ehrenfreund, A Majority of
Millennials Now Reject Capitalism, Poll Shows, WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/04/26/a-majority-of-millennials-now-rejectcapitalism-poll-shows/?utm_term=.4f91019c2ee1 [https://perma.cc/T5NY-QRRD].
70. See The Dalai Lama & Arthur C. Brooks, Dalai Lama: Behind Our Anxiety, the Fear of
Being Unneeded, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/04/opinion/dalailama-behind-our-anxiety-the-fear-of-being-unneeded.html (arguing that unemployment contributes to
a debilitating sense of a lack of purpose in life, as well as financial stress); see also Eduardo Porter, A
Universal Basic Income Is a Poor Tool to Fight Poverty, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/01/business/economy/universal-basic-income-poverty.html?_r=2
(arguing that employment provides opportunities for personal progress, self-discipline, and purpose).
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Shareholders.71 This collective sense of community, especially when
combined with increased equality, economic security, and public support
for capitalism, pays additional dividends by reducing the likelihood of
destructive civic unrest.72
Finally, Blueprint promotes intergenerational equity and progress.
The present-day corporate emphasis on maximizing “shareholder value”
tends to focus corporate managers on immediate financial results, whether
measured by accounting profits or by share price. This can cause
corporations to pass up investment opportunities that would generate
primarily long-term returns, for example, by declining to pursue the kind
of fundamental research that leads to transformative innovations that
benefit future generations.73 Similarly, a focus on immediate financial
returns tempts corporate managers to ignore social costs likely to be
incurred primarily in the future, such as the costs of climate change. By
creating a class of empowered long-term Shareholders, Blueprint would
help corporations invest in the kind of innovation that benefits future
generations. It would also allow prosocial Shareholders to better express
their preferences for controlling generation-spanning external costs like
pollution and climate change.
III.

CHALLENGES AND CRITIQUES

Space constraints preclude our addressing every possible objection
or obstacle to implementing Blueprint here. Instead, we discuss the most
obvious issues: adequacy and sources of funding; agency costs imposed
by Fund Administrators; reduced informational efficiency in stock pricing;
practical obstacles to Shareholder voting; and the risk of irrational or
antisocial Shareholder preferences.
A. Adequacy and Sources of Funding
As an initial matter, the size of the Portfolio determines the degree to
which Blueprint promotes democratic capitalism but does not change the
71. See LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 145–
47, 238–42 (2011) (discussing how a sense of common fate promotes perceptions of in-group identity
that foster trust, trustworthiness, and other prosocial behaviors).
72. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, Income Distribution, Political Instability, and
Investment, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 1203, 1217–19 (1996) (reporting that income inequality increases
socio-political instability). In the 2013 World of Work report, the International Labour Organization
warned that joblessness, especially long-term unemployment, has fueled social unrest, especially in
advanced economies. INT’L LABOUR ORG., WORLD OF WORK REPORT 2013: REPAIRING THE
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FABRIC 14–16 (2013), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_214476.pdf [https://perma.cc/R386-PMFM].
73. See generally Stout, supra note 46.
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direction of its effects. The only question is whether the Blueprint would
have more, or less, impact.
For the past five years, U.S. corporate profits have averaged about
$1.6 trillion annually.74 There are an estimated 227 million U.S. citizens
over the age of eighteen.75 This means corporate profits per adult citizen
average over $7,000 annually. The impact of Blueprint, in terms of the
significance of the income to and influence exercised by Shareholders,
depends on how large a percentage of outstanding corporate securities are
held by the Fund. For example, if the Fund held ten percent of all equities,
each Shareholder’s representative interest in corporate profits would
amount to about $700 annually. The larger the share of equities held by
the Fund, the greater Blueprint’s impact.
There are several ways the Fund could amass a significant Portfolio
relatively quickly. First, ultra-high-net worth individuals are a significant
potential source of portfolio donations. The upper decile of wealth-holders
own more than eighty percent of all stocks,76 and eventually their fortunes
must change hands; it has been estimated that $60 trillion will be
transferred from U.S. estates between 2007 and 2061.77 This cohort
already frequently participates in philanthropy. For example, David
Callahan reports that charitable giving from people making over $500,000
annually increased fifty-seven percent from 2003 to 2013; Callahan argues
that for the ultra-wealthy with “vast fortunes . . . philanthropy is the only
real place the money can go.”78 If the top decile of equity holders
contribute half their holdings to the Portfolio, while living or upon death,
the Fund would within a few decades come to hold forty percent of all

74. See U.S. Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Corporate Profits After Tax with Inventory Valuation
Adjustment (IVA) and Capital Consumption Adjustment (CCAdj), FRED, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS
(Oct. 27, 2017), https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPATAX [https://perma.cc/6GA6-2MSN].
75. Electorate Profiles: Selected Characteristics of the Citizen, 18 and Older Population, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/voting-andregistration/electorate-profiles-2016.html [https://perma.cc/9QQK-JJKH].
76. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 489, 518 (2013) (citing Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Household Wealth in
the United States: Rising Debt and the Middle Class Squeeze—An Update to 2007, 58 tbl.l5a (Levy
Econ. lnst., Working Paper No. 589, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1585409).
77. John J. Havens & Paul G. Schervish, A Golden Age for Philanthropy Still Beckons: National
Wealth Transfer and Potential for Philanthropy Technical Report 13 (May 28, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Ctr. on Wealth and Philanthropy, Boston Coll.),
https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/research_sites/cwp/pdf/A%20Golden%20Age%20of%20Phila
nthropy%20Still%20Bekons.pdf [https://perma.cc/UDR7-Q5HU].
78. DAVID CALLAHAN, THE GIVERS: WEALTH, POWER, AND PHILANTHROPY IN A NEW GILDED
AGE 18 (2017).
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corporate equities. This proportion would continue to grow as long as the
ultra-wealthy choose to contribute.
Second, corporations also have reason to donate their own shares.
Contributing to the Fund can appeal to consumers, employees, and
investors (consider the success of Google’s “Don’t Be Evil” strategy
during its IPO or current interest in so-called “benefit corporations”).79 In
addition, because the Fund is a long-term shareholder, donating stock to
the Fund will appeal to some public companies as a means of
counterbalancing the influence of short-term shareholders, especially
activist hedge funds.80
Finally, although our proposal assumes the Fund would acquire its
Portfolio through donations, the Fund’s effectiveness could be accelerated
through government support. At a minimum, treating donations to the
Fund like other tax-deductible charitable contributions promotes donor
interest. More ambitiously, government revenues raised from taxes or
other sources could be used to buy shares to place in the Fund. This
requires legislative action, but such a policy might enjoy widespread
public support given Blueprint’s broad benefits.
B. Agency Costs Imposed by Fund Administrators
Because the value of the Portfolio might measure in the trillions of
dollars, it is important to protect against the possibility that Administrators
might impose agency costs on Shareholders by shirking or stealing.81 Our
plan includes several such protective elements.
Perhaps the primary source of Shareholder protection is the very
limited discretion granted to Administrators under Blueprint. Unlike
managers of a typical mutual fund, Administrators would not be allowed
to trade securities or determine how securities in the Portfolio are voted.
There is relatively little damage they can do to Shareholders’ interests.
Their job is indeed purely administrative (maintaining lists of
Shareholders and securities in the Portfolio, ensuring dividends are
79. See Kim et al., supra note 14; see also Google Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Apr.
29,
2004),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504073639/ds1.htm#
toc16167_1 [https://perma.cc/C5P6-S4DZ].
80. In effect, donating shares to the Fund becomes a form of anti-takeover protection. See Tamara
C. Belinfanti, Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 863–64 (2014)
(discussing how shareholder cultivation could serve as an anti-takeover defense); Edward B. Rock,
Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 849, 865–66 (2012) (discussing
how “relational” investors can provide value to the firm or just provide “takeover protection” for
managers).
81. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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“passed through” equally to all Shareholders, and ensuring equities in the
Portfolio are voted according to Shareholders’ directions). Modern
information technologies have made these administrative tasks far less
costly.82
Additional protection against agency costs could be built into the
Administrators’ compensation. For example, Administrators could be paid
a predetermined fee that would not change based on the value or
performance of the Portfolio, thus reducing the possibility of perverse
incentives.
Finally, various processes could be adopted to maximize the chances
that the individuals selected to become Administrators are ethical and
representative of Shareholders’ interests. For example, Administrators
could be periodically elected by Shareholders; drawn at random from the
citizenry as jurors are chosen; subject to term limits; selected to represent
certain demographics; and so forth.
C. Reduced Informational Efficiency in Stock Pricing
Because the Fund would not trade the stocks in its Portfolio, the
larger the percentage of a company’s shares held by the Fund, the less
trading there is likely to be in that company’s shares. This may reduce the
“informational efficiency” of the market price of the company’s shares.83
A similar concern has been raised with regard to index funds, which also
trade rarely.84
However, so long as any significant portion of a company’s shares
are owned and traded by individual or institutional shareholders outside
the Fund, market prices are likely to remain at least somewhat
informationally efficient. Moreover, it can be argued that the benefits
associated with marginal increases in informational efficiency are small.85
Finally, it is not clear that companies need publicly-reported stock prices
82. See supra text accompanying note 18 (discussing mutual fund administrative costs).
83. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
84. See Eric Belasco, Michael Finke & David Nanigian, The Impact of Passive Investing on
Corporate Valuations, 38 MANAGERIAL FIN. 1067, 1082 (2012); James Ledbetter, Is Passive
Investment Actively Hurting the Economy?, NEW YORKER (Mar. 9, 2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/is-passive-investment-actively-hurting-the-economy.
85. See generally Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis
of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1988). Market efficiency
is most important when companies are issuing equity to raise capital (which happens rarely, see id. at
645–47); when executive pay is tied to share price (which Shareholders could change, see supra notes
6, 56 (discussing Shareholder reform of executive compensation)); and when control of a company is
purchased by acquiring its stock (which happens rarely and generally only in response to dramatic
share price declines, see Stout, supra note 85, at 685–92 (discussing stock price in takeovers)).
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at all to function effectively, as demonstrated by the long-term success of
many private companies.
D. Logistics of Shareholder Voting
Voting the shares of companies to improve corporate performance is
a classic common good; one shareholder incurs all the costs of becoming
informed and casting their votes, and all shareholders enjoy the resulting
benefits. Thus, it can be expected that many shareholders will be
disinclined to become informed and vote. Like most present-day
individual shareholders, Shareholders will be “rationally apathetic.”86
This can be ameliorated by requiring the Administrators to dedicate
some percentage of the income received by the Fund to pay proxy advisory
firms selected by the Shareholders. Like today’s proxy advisory services,
these services would develop voting guidelines that direct the
Administrators on how to vote the portion of the shares in the portfolio
attributable to the Shareholders who selected that service. Because the
Fund will pay fees in proportion to the number of Shareholders who select
a particular proxy service, incentives are created to develop new services
that cater to Shareholders on the basis of the quality of their voting
guidelines, rather than low cost. Such new proxy advisory services would
take better account of Shareholders’ stronger preferences for long-term
financial performance and for better corporate social, environmental, and
ethical performance.
Using new information technologies, individual Shareholders could
also be given the option to directly inform Administrators how to vote their
portion of the shares held in the Portfolio. But, unless Shareholders are
compensated for doing so, rational apathy is likely to deter them. This may
be desirable; share voting guidelines developed by competing proxy
services would likely be more informed and efficient than voting decisions
made by relatively uninformed individual Shareholders. Although
Shareholders would still need to inform themselves about the quality and
nature of competing proxy services, this is a much less burdensome task
than becoming informed about the performance of all the companies
whose shares are held in the Portfolio. Shareholders could further be
encouraged to select a proxy service by making a Shareholder’s receipt of
payments from the Fund contingent on doing so.

86. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 1260, 1268–69 (2009)
(discussing rational shareholder apathy).
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E. The Risk of Irrational or Antisocial Shareholder Preferences
Some readers might fear that Shareholders, if given a greater role in
corporate governance, might make even worse decisions than today’s
institutional shareholders and proxy advisory services. In particular,
Shareholders might prove even more short-sighted, or even more willing
to impose external costs and withhold external benefits in the pursuit of
personal financial gain.
This paternalistic critique implicitly assumes significantly superior
foresight on the part of institutional investors who are presumed to
participate in corporate governance in a fashion that serves their
beneficiaries’ best interests. This outcome is highly unlikely given the
perverse incentives institutional investors face.87 Given the very short
stock holding periods typical of today’s institutional investors, and the
much longer time frame of Shareholders, it is extremely unlikely that
empowering Shareholders could make the problem of short-termism
worse.
There is also reason to believe that Shareholders would be much
more interested in the problems of constraining corporate external costs
and maximizing corporate social benefits than the institutional fund
managers that dominate corporate governance today are. This is because,
compared to fund managers, Shareholders are more vulnerable to
corporate external costs like job losses or environmental pollution, and are
more dependent on corporate external benefits like skills training or
quality products. Similarly, they may be more interested in promoting
corporate political transparency than the ultra-wealthy, who are more
likely to benefit from corporate rent-seeking.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have provided a thumbnail sketch of a proposal to
address many currently pressing social and economic problems and, in the
process, restore public faith in the idea of a democratic capitalism that
serves the vast majority of people. We have shown how implementing
Blueprint would provide a number of significant benefits and is unlikely
to present any dangers. Practical challenges exist, but they can be
overcome. The only real question is the degree to which Blueprint is
implemented and its potential benefits become a reality.
Our proposal, however, faces another obstacle: certain widely held,
often unconscious, and fundamentally erroneous beliefs about how the
world works. We mention some of these psychological hurdles below in

87. See supra notes 50–52 (discussing perverse incentives of fund managers).
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the hope that drawing attention to them and to their inaccuracy can temper
their effect.
The first erroneous belief is the often-automatic assumption that all
policy problems must be solved either through market forces or by
government intervention. This assumption overlooks the demonstrated
reality that private ordering often provides a third way, superior to either
free markets or regulation, for addressing certain economic and social
problems. History has shown that private organizations are capable of
amassing enormous assets and exercising great influence.88 Consider, for
example, the Red Cross, the Sierra Club, private universities, and the
Catholic Church. Modern business corporations—some of which rival
nation-states in their power and influence—are yet another example of the
power of private ordering. Corporations emerged as private ordering
solutions to the problem of aggregating resources to pursue long-term,
large-scale, and uncertain projects requiring specific investments.89 By
proposing Blueprint, we simply take the concept of private ordering as a
policy solution to the next level.
A second psychological hurdle to implementing Blueprint is the
common, but empirically incorrect, assumption that human beings are
purely selfish actors concerned only with amassing financial wealth. This
often-unconscious assumption, which is a staple of more-superficial
economic analysis, has been definitively proven false by innumerable
research studies in cognitive psychology, behavioral economics,
developmental psychology, anthropology, neuroscience, evolutionary
science, social psychology, and biology.90 It also flies in the face of
centuries of human altruism and devotion to nonprofit endeavors, not to
mention present-day individual and corporate philanthropy. Given this
reality, it is not implausible that Blueprint could be organized and funded
in reliance upon some degree of human altruism.
Finally, there is a natural human tendency to assume that any policy
solution or arrangement we have not seen at work before must suffer from
some fundamental flaw and cannot work in the future. In the past, this
tendency has motivated resistance to many important social changes we
now recognize to be beneficial. Examples include the adoption of
representative democracy, the abolition of human slavery, free public
88. See generally Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745
(1996); Steven L. Schwarz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319 (2002).
89. See generally Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for
Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2004); Schwartz, supra note
46; Stout, supra note 46.
90. See generally ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, BEHAVE: THE BIOLOGY OF HUMANS AT OUR BEST
AND WORST (2017); ELLIOTT SOBER & DAVID SLOAN-WILSON, UNTO OTHERS: THE EVOLUTION AND
PSYCHOLOGY OF UNSELFISH BEHAVIOR (1998); STOUT, supra note 71.
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education, and the granting of full legal rights to women. As these
examples illustrate, we would do well to believe we can do better in the
future than we have done in the past. This Blueprint for Citizen Capitalism
provides a hopeful path to such a better future.

